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Abstract: 
This empirical work applies a duration model to the study of factors determining 
privatization of local water services. I assess how factors determining privatization 
decision evolve as time goes by. A sample of 133 Spanish municipalities during the six 
terms of office taken place during the 1980-2002 period is analyzed. A dynamic 
neighboring effect is hypothesized and successfully tested. In a first stage, private water 
supply firms may try to expand to regions where there is no service privatized, in order 
to spread over this region after having being installed thanks to its scale advantages. 
Other factors influencing privatization decision evolve during the two decades under 
study, from the priority to fix old infrastructures to the concern about service efficiency. 
Some complementary results regarding political and budgetary factors are also obtained. 
 
Resumen: 
Este trabajo empírico utiliza un modelo de duración en el estudio de los factores 
determinantes de la privatización del servicio de aguas municipal. Se presta especial 
atención a cómo los factores determinantes de la privatización evolucionan a lo largo 
del tiempo. Una muestra de 133 municipios españoles durante las seis legislaturas 
habidas entre 1980 y 2002 es minuciosamente analizada. Se presenta y se comprueba la 
hipótesis del efecto proximidad dinámico. En los primeros años, las empresas 
contratistas tratan de instalarse en regiones y comarcas donde hasta la fecha el nivel de 
privatización había sido nulo o muy bajo, para así poder expandirse dentro de ellas sin 
apenas competencia gracias a sus consecuentes ventajas de escala. Otros factores 
influyentes en la decisión de privatizar evolucionan a lo largo de las dos décadas 
estudiadas, desde la inicial prioridad en la reparación de infraestructuras 
descapitalizadas durante el antiguo régimen hasta la más moderna preocupación por 
cuestiones de eficiencia en la gestión del servicio de aguas. También se obtienen 
resultados sobre la influencia de factores políticos y presupuestarios. 
 
1. Introduction 
Literature on local service privatization in Spain has not been as wide as has been 
the literature about national firms’ privatization. Nevertheless, the former field has been 
discussed quite more deeply in other countries. In the United States, mid-seventies tax 
revolts, plus higher quality demand in local services and harder budget constraints were 
determinant towards searching for efficiency-improving policies (Savas, 1998). In the 
United Kingdom, pro-privatization reform was conducted by the conservative central 
government during the mid and late eighties (Ascher, 1987), finally yielding the 1988 
Local Government Act, which established periodical compulsory lowest-price 
competitive tendering for most of local services. In recent years, however, this law has 
been smoothened in the search for other values apart from the lowest provision price. 
During the eighties and the nineties, in both countries as in others as Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand, studies on privatization efficiency performance 
proliferated. Despite a high variety of results, there was some consensus on the fact that 
privatization induces cost savings as compared to traditional public production. 
Nevertheless, other alternative policies were acknowledged to offer cost savings as well 
(Domberger, Meadowcroft and Thompson, 1994; Hodge, 2000). 
After having checked the relative goodness of privatization, American economists 
started wondering why, if privatization was that good, it was not a dominant mode of 
local service production. Some economists looked for motivations connected to political 
profits and costs of privatization (López-de-Silanes, Schleifer and Vishny, 1997). Other 
economists tried to find motivations linked to a transaction costs perspective, and some 
of them pointed out that public service reform was something much more complex than 
the simple public-private dilemma (Kodrzycki, 1998; Warner and Hebdon, 2001). 
The aim of this paper is merely empirical, and includes hypothesis stemming from 
both approaches. By means of a repetitive binomial choice model, based on a simple 
politician’s utility function, I construct a discrete-time duration model that contributes 
to find the causes underlying Spanish municipalities’ public service reform decisions 
concerning the local water supply service. 
Section two justifies the motivation that induces the author to use a duration model 
approach, more complete than the most commonly used cross-section discrete choice 
models. Section three presents explanatory variables, hypothesis supporting their 
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inclusion, and data sources. Section four presents the model and its results. Section five 
concludes. An appendix with complementary estimations is included. 
Local service privatization is not a new phenomenon in Spain. As in France, 
privatization cases are registered since the XIX century, and institutional framework is 
flexible regarding the mode of production that municipalities could decide concerning 
local services. In Spain, a privatization spreading process started at the beginning of 
Spanish young democracy, giving rise to interesting fields of study for economists. 
 
2. Motivation and contents of this paper 
The scarce econometric studies on local service privatization decision are commonly 
based on a cross-section discrete choice analysis (López-de-Silanes, Schleifer and 
Vishny, 1997; Kodrzycki, 1998; Ménard and Saussier, 2000; Warner and Hebdon, 
2001; Christoffersen and Paldam, 2003). When a study is focused on a sample of 
individuals referring to the same period of time, one could wonder whether estimation 
results reflect exactly what they tried to or not, that is, whether they identify or not the 
factors that push municipal politician towards taking the privatization decision. If we 
take a sample of municipalities and we just observe whether the service was privatized 
or not in some precise period t, then we are just answering to the question “Why do 
some municipalities have the service privatized in that moment of time and others do 
not?”, but not exactly to “Why some municipalities decide to privatize around some 
period t and others do not?”. We would be answering to both questions only if we 
assumed that politician decision is reversible, so that he is constantly taking a decision 
between public or private production. Also, we would be answering the same question if 
we assumed that explanatory variables are time-invariant. But both assumptions are 
from my point of view unusually accomplished. This is due to the fact that factors 
pushing politicians towards service privatization are different from the ones that cause 
politicians to maintain the service privatized. Once privatization has been undertaken, 
there might not be possibility of reversion, or this possibility could be too costly. This 
hypothesis, which is continuously confirmed by evidence (see this paper, Christoffersen 
and Paldam , 2003, and Ménard and Saussier, 2000), is called the privatization 
irreversibility hypothesis, and rides out the flexibility of the mode-of-production 
decision that is implicitly assumed in cross-section analysis. 
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Applying this hypothesis, it can be seen that variables measured in t, the year our 
study refers to, hardly ever have to do with the ones measured at tt ≤* , where t* is the 
year of privatization. So, if we want to explain something about the privatization 
decision in period t, we have to select the sample, taking into account municipalities 
that have not privatized in t-1 only (this is done in the additional switching model 
presented in López-de-Silanes, Schleifer and Vishny, 1997). Given to sample selection, 
we have to be aware that now we are answering the “conditional” question “Why do 
some municipalities decide to privatize the service in the period t given that they did not 
do so between 0 and t-1?”. We are analyzing then facts that are conditional to past 
events, so the model remains incomplete and biased if we try to extract unconditional, 
unhistorical explanations to the privatization issue. 
Bel and Miralles (2003) try to explain some unconditional factors influencing local 
service privatization. They consider the possibility of creating a cross-section sample 
not referring to the same period of time t, but to the so-called critical period t* 
( ). Obviously, this moment of time differs among municipalities. The critical 
period is the one in which municipal politician decides to introduce any form of 
privatization in the service. That way, we answer both the question “Which factors 
influence the politician towards service privatization during all periods under study?” 
and the question “Which factors explain having the service privatized in t?”. 
tt ≤< *0
This model presents its limitations, though. On the one hand, it is possible that each 
period had its own causes, which are not distinguished by a cross-section around t*. On 
the other hand, this question arises: “What is the critical period for a municipality that 
has not privatized its service?”. In the quoted paper, authors chose the last period (t) 
under study, as the model starts from the same moment t for all municipalities and then 
searches for critical periods for the ones that have privatized. But a definitive solution is 
still pending. 
From this discussion about previous methods used, it is clear that we need an 
intermediate solution that could be able to integrate both the critical period (t*) and the 
last period under study (t). I propose in this paper the use of time series *,...,2,1 t=τ , 
where t* is the critical moment or, in case of not having privatized, the final period t. I 
obtain a panel data model that can extract explanations, for any period τ , to the 
question “Why do some municipalities privatize the service in the period τ  given that 
they did not do so between periods 0 and 1−τ ?”. In turn, the model can aggregate these 
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conditional, path-dependent explanations to obtain the unconditional ones, answering 
the question “Which factors push municipal politicians towards service privatization 
during all periods under study?”. 
In this paper, I analyze the factors that provoke the undertaking of privatization 
policies in the water supply local service during the current Spanish democracy. I use a 
sample of Spanish municipalities from the region of Catalonia, obtained through the 
Local Service Production Survey (from now on, LSPS)1, elaborated in 2000 and 
actualized to October 31st, 2002. 
Each four-year term of office between elections has been taken as a “period” unit. 
Usually, privatization decisions are part of an electoral program2. Besides, politician 
cares about in-charge mandate results much more than to future consequences of their 
policies. Thus, the number of periods under study is six, that is, the number of local 
elections taken place during the current Spanish democracy. Periods are: 1980-1983, 
1984-1987, 1988-1991, 1992-1995, 1996-1999 and 2000-2002. For each municipality 
and period, the mode of production and other variables have been observed. 
 
3. Hypothesis, variables and data 
The explained variable, Y, is a binary variable that, for each municipality and for 
each period under study, takes value 1 if there was any kind of water service 
privatization at its end3, and takes value 0 otherwise. Data have been collected through 
the LSPS. Some hypotheses explaining this variable are listed below. Each hypothesis 
makes reference, when applicable, to other previous work on the issue, and is followed 
by an explanation about the proxies I use to test them. 
Hypothesis 1: Factors explaining local water service privatization during the first 
years of young democracies as Spanish one differ from the ones that explain water 
service privatization in recent years. 
                                                          
1 This Survey was designed by the “Public Policy and Economic Regulation” Research Unit, at 
University of Barcelona. It was sent to the 946 Catalonian municipalities. It received a total of 133 
answers, a 13.3% of sent surveys. It represented roughly the 60% of Catalonian population. Thus, results 
are less explanatory for low-populated municipalities. But for municipalities with more than 1,000 
inhabitants, the sample is more representative. 37% municipalities with a population between 5,000 and 
10,000 inhabitants answered the survey. So did 50% municipalities between 20,000 and 50,000 and 66% 
more-than-50,000-inhabitant municipalities. Sample could be considered as randomly obtained, although 
results may be taken cautiously for municipalities with less than 1,000 inhabitants.   
2 Although they could be part of the hidden program. 
3 This includes delegation contracts as well as creation of joint-ventures that operate water supply service. 
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During the first years of current Spanish democracy, the political agenda concerning 
water supply service was centered on solving the serious lack-of-infrastructure problem 
that was inherited from the dictatorial regime (FMQ Projectes i Estudis, 1999). A huge 
amount of investment was necessary in some municipalities in order to meet increasing 
quality demands, above all in high-populated areas and tourism destinations. In turn, 
municipalities seldom had enough financial capacity to undertake those investments, 
hence having to arrive to agreements with private enterprises. If my hypothesis were 
valid, relatively high-populated municipalities and relatively tourism-intensive ones 
would be more in favor of water service privatization during the eighties. So I define the 
variables POP (population) and TOUR (tourism intensity). POP is taken from the five-
year periodical census at the Statistical Institute of Catalonia (from now on, Idescat), 
which is the most reliable database. These are data for the years 1975, 1981, 1986, 
1991, 1996 and 2000, and each of them is taken as the representative population during 
each of the six periods under study. TOUR is measured as the number of hotel and 
camping accommodations that the municipality has per 1,000 inhabitants in each of the 
same years as the ones listed for POP. Data are also obtained from Idescat. 
In the nineties, once having met all satisfactory standards in water provision, the 
local politician’s agenda directed its attention to efficiency issues. This could have 
provoked a change in the privatization patterns, so that POP and TOUR might not have 
the same influence on the endogenous variable as they had during the eighties. 
Hypothesis 2: During the nineties, while the political agenda was focusing on 
efficiency issues, a new wave of public sector reforms other than privatization started 
having effects on local service production. Municipalities with high-skilled bureaucrats 
and politicians were more prone to implement these alternative policies. 
As the turn to the efficiency issue was starting, a new line of economic research in 
the United Kingdom and the United States started putting into doubt the irrefutability of 
privatization goodness. Authors as Sclar (2000) revealed by continuos exhibition of 
case studies that in some municipalities there were examples of non-privatizing local 
service reforms that were working quite well. Warner and Hebdon (2001) also argue 
that public service reform is something much more complicated than the public-private 
dilemma. There are many other types of reform, as service-specific municipality 
association and creation of private-law publicly owned service-producing firms. 
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Yet, these kinds of alternative reforms are quite tough to be implemented by low-
skilled politicians and bureaucrats, who would just contract the service out if they found 
that it was poorly performing. Thus, if my hypothesis is not invalid, large-populated 
municipalities that had not yet privatized before the nineties would be now relatively 
less interested in privatization. This is due to the fact that, usually, largely populated 
towns and cities have skilled public servants and politicians. The variable POP will be 
useful to check my point of view. 
Hypothesis 3: When there is concern about efficiency in production and there is not 
consensus about the goodness of privatization, given in part by the rise of alternative 
ways to introduce improvements, party differentiation arises in deciding which local 
service reform is to be undertaken. 
The major consensus about ideological matters and party differentiation concerning 
privatization has so far been that these issues have nothing to do with the mode of 
production that is chosen. In other words, assuming that one mode of production is the 
best one in some circumstances, both conservative and non-conservative parties tend to 
this mode of production. This is found in López-de-Silanes, Schleifer and Vishny 
(1997), Ménard and Saussier (2000), Bel and Miralles (2003) and Chistoffersen and 
Paldam (2003). Here, nevertheless, I postulate a new idea that can be tested in this 
duration model setup. When there is concern about efficiency and there is uncertainty 
about the best mode of production, ideological issues matter4. Each party will tend to 
support the reform policy that suits best with the ideology it defends in front of its 
voters5. To see that, I elaborated variable PI, the political index, which is a dummy 
variable that takes value 1 if a conservative party (coalition) is governing during the 
period under consideration and value 0 if there is a non-conservative party (coalition) in 
office. 
It is clear that creating such a variable is somewhat delicate, so I paid much effort in 
constructing it. The variable has been mainly constructed from the data of the General 
Files of Catalonian Municipalities, elaborated by the Municipalities Federation of 
                                                          
4 Non-conservative parties could be willing to undertake reforms that enhance water service production 
efficiency while not renouncing to public ownership. This is due by the fact that this service has a well-
known lack of effective competition in the privatized market. More conservative parties could rely on 
privatization despite this lack of competition, following the ideas of Hart, Schleifer and Vishny (1997). 
These ideas are focused on the property rights approach: in a public production setup, a manager has few 
incentives to innovate (either reducing costs or increasing quality), as he cannot reclaim the rights over 
this innovation. 
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Catalonia. These files contain name, political affiliation and charge of each municipal 
representative of each Local Council. Knowing mayor’s political affiliation and the 
affiliation of other persons in charge has allowed me to create this index6. In the first 
period (1980-1983), however, the ideological identity of governing parties, coalitions 
and organizations was so unclear that I had to skip this variable for this period. 
If my hypothesis is correct, this variable should have influence on the endogenous 
variable during the nineties, but not during the eighties. 
Hypothesis 4: The dynamic neighboring effect. 
One of the novelties of this paper is the statement and positive testing of this 
hypothesis. Bel and Miralles (2003) and Christoffersen and Paldam (2003) depicted the 
so-called neighboring effect in the same year, an effect that was also pointed out by 
Reimer (1999). They found that municipalities surrounded by other ones that had 
previously privatized the service had in turn a higher probability to privatize it than 
municipalities that were not surrounded by privatizing municipalities. 
There are two explanations for this phenomenon. Both papers coincide in the first 
one, which refers to the political cost concept. If a municipality is surrounded by 
municipalities that have already privatized some service, then the former one is able to 
observe others’ neighboring experiences, which reduces uncertainties concerning 
privatization performance. Also, a “pro-privatization” message is less politically costly 
when the experience has been observed in surrounding towns and cities. A second 
explanation, explained in Bel and Miralles (2003), makes reference to efficiency issues. 
A municipality hardly ever constitutes the optimal geographical area when producing a 
local service, because of so-called geographical scales economies (Donahue, 1989). A 
private firm is less constrained than public organizations when expanding through 
several municipalities, hence taking advantage of these scale economies. Therefore, a 
firm that is established in a municipality could make good expansion offers to 
surrounding municipalities7. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
5 From another point of view, this uncertainty feeds discretionary search for party’s hidden aims in its 
relations with private contractors. 
6 Sometimes the governing party, coalition or organization was not clearly identified into the ideological 
line. The problem has been addressed by observing the identity of parties in opposition, or, in a few cases, 
by observing the results of the nearest National Election in this municipality (data found at Idescat). 
7 Bivand and Szymanski (1997, 2000) present, first in a theoretical framework, and secondly in an 
empirical one, their research on how English and Welsh local governments, when still maintaining public 
service production, set surrounding municipalities’ results as a comparative benchmark to follow, given 
the lack of information about maximum attainable efficiency. As a result, average costs are very similar 
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So far, this is the static version of the neighboring effect. Now, imagine that we are 
in the first stages of the privatization spreading process. There are zones where there is a 
high percentage of privatizing municipalities, while there are others where the service is 
publicly produced in almost every municipality. A forward-looking firm already 
installed in the former zone is to decide its expansion plan. It could simply take 
advantage of geographical scale economies and make an offer to a municipality of the 
former zone. Or it could take the risk and try to enter the latter zone, as he knows that 
there is a high probability, as discussed above, of expanding after some years to other 
municipalities in this “unexplored” region, hence getting more profits in the future8. 
Then, in the first stages of the privatization-spreading process, there are two 
contradictory forces and the static neighboring effect may not hold. If this hypothesis is 
correct, the static neighboring effect may only be observed in recent years, i.e. the 
nineties, while something opposite to this static view of the neighboring effect may 
happen during the first eighties. 
The variable I use to measure the neighboring effect, which I call NEIGH, is defined 
as the percentage of municipalities of the Official Zone9 the observed municipality 
belongs to that have already privatized the service at the beginning of the period under 
consideration. Following my hypothesis, its influence on the endogenous variable 
should be positive during the nineties, while its sign should be not clear, or even 
negative, during the eighties. Data for this variable are extracted from the LSPS. 
Hypothesis 5: Hard budgetary shortfalls enhance the use of privatization. 
During the economic crisis that Spain bitterly experienced between 1992 and 1994, 
municipalities that had been progressively getting indebted found that their available 
resources during those years were very scarce. In such a context, a municipality is 
bound to undertake hard cost-saving programs. While alternatives to privatization 
implied some initial investments and other expenses, privatization had the advantage of 
being cheap and even profitable, due to the fee that contractor usually has to pay to the 
municipality10. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
among municipalities in the same region. The same idea could perfectly be applied to the privatization of 
a local service when its results are not clear ex ante. 
8 A theoretical paper by Miralles (2004), using auction theory, shows that existence of these expected 
future profits increases effective competition for the contract of the first municipality that privatizes the 
service in some region. 
9 Catalonia currently has 6 Official Zones. 
10 López-de-Silanes, Schleifer and Vishny (1997) observe, for the United States case, that state laws 
constraining municipal debt growth capacity enhance the tendency to privatization. Kodrzycki (1998) 
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To assess this idea, I have elaborated the variable AFB, the average financial burden. 
It is equal to the arithmetic mean of the IFB of the two previous years to the period 
under study. IFB is the Index of Financial Burden, the percentage of municipal debt 
costs (interest plus amortization) on municipal current returns (taxes and fund transfers). 
Data are taken from the General Accounts of Local Corporations, edited by the Audit 
Commission of Catalonia. These General Accounts are compiled only since 1990, so 
the AFB is only collected for the last three periods under study11. The AFB is a good 
variable because it measures the difficulties that a municipality has to become more 
indebted. 
Other considerations: efficiency and population dispersion; groups of interest; and 
combinations of different kinds of public sector reform. 
Finally, I present some variables that are worth it to be assessed, although I do not 
formulate a precise hypothesis about their effects. 
Concerning efficiency, I have taken into account the fact that municipality 
dispersion may imply some management difficulties. In Spain, a municipality may have 
several geographically separate villages, towns or cities. A disperse municipality, with a 
high number of towns, has in average more pipeline length and more volume of water in 
reservoirs per day than a “concentrated” one (MCRIT, 1996). This implies a higher risk 
of leaks and a more complex management. Municipalities with this problem may need 
help from a private firm. Following this idea, I have used the variable SPE, singular 
population entities, which is just the number of separate towns, villages or cities that a 
municipality has. Data are taken from Idescat, and are available only for 2001. But this 
variable is quite constant over time, so its value is used in any of the six periods under 
study. 
Concerning groups of interests, it is though (but difficult to prove) that industrial 
water consumers are cross-subsidizing household water consumers by means of paying 
quite high water tariffs (while underpricing household consumption). This is explained 
by a political interest argument, considering household consumers as voters. The 
argument could be outweighed by the fact that industrial consumers could offer other 
                                                                                                                                                                          
observes that an increase in the budgetary deficit positively affects the probability of privatization. Bel 
and Costas (2000) study the privatization of national companies in Spain and deduce that one of the 
factors that explain the privatization process was the necessity of obtaining cash returns in order to meet 
European convergence criteria. 
11 Besides, there were no data for some municipalities, so the sample loses observations whenever this 
variable is used. 
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types of (hidden) support to politicians. But if the former argument were true, industrial 
consumers would be interested in separating political power from water service control, 
therefore enhancing privatization. So, in order to assess this, I have used the proxy IND, 
the percentage of active population that works in the industrial sector. Data are collected 
from Idescat, and are available only for 1986, 1991 and 1996. I have used the 1986 data 
in the first tow periods, the 1991 ones in the next two and the 1996 data in the last two 
periods. 
Also concerning groups of interest, it could be thought that a municipality with 
powerful worker unions would deter privatization, as it is known that this policy 
worsens labor conditions (López-de-Silanes, Schleifer and Vishny, 1997; Chistoffersen 
and Paldam, 2003). But for the water service case, labor participation is quite low and 
unimportant. Roughly 80% water service cost comes from capital maintenance and 
investment (Ménard and Saussier, 2000). Hence, I have skipped this issue in my 
analysis, while I acknowledge its importance in other types of service. 
A final consideration concerns the fact that different kinds of public service reform 
could be either incompatible with each other or just the opposite, that is, 
complementary. Warner and Hebdon (2001) state that public service reform is 
something that goes beyond the public-private dilemma. There is a wide menu of 
different reforms that could be undertaken. Besides, different kinds of reforms could be 
combined with each other. In my analysis, I have simplified the scenario by assuming 
the public-private dilemma, in order to obtain a handy duration model. But, taking into 
consideration Warner and Hebdon’s proposal, I have included a variable that can assess 
the relation between privatization and other kind of public sector reform. This variable, 
MASS, municipality association, is a dummy that takes value 1 if the municipality took 
part in a specific water supply municipality association in the period under 
consideration, and 0 otherwise12. Data are collected from the LSPS. 
Municipality association could be conceived as an alternative to privatization, as it is 
another way to exploit geographical scale economies. But, in turn, municipal 
association reduces political costs induced by privatization, as the distance between 
                                                          
12 I have adopted a wide concept of water supply municipality association. There are few cases of “strict” 
associations, understood as the delegation of the service to a supra-municipal public organization. But 
there are also “indirect” associations, produced by supply network sharing among several municipalities 
due to urban continuity. Sharing the network imply that organizational decisions must be taken by 
consensus, implying an indirect form of association. Additionally, there are so-called “implicit” 
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citizens and decision-taking organization increases. So it is not clear what the final 
effect will be. 
 
4. The model and results 
The representative local politician in a municipality where some local service is so 
far publicly produced has an expected utility increase function derived from the fact of 
privatizing the service that by assumption takes the following linear form: 
ittitit XU ε+Β=∆  
where: 
itX  is a row vector that contains a one plus the above quoted explanatory variables, for 
municipality i during the period t. 
),...,( 0 kttt ββ≡Β  is a coefficient vector, where k is the number of explanatory variables. 
Notice that we assume that there could be variability in the coefficients among the different 
periods. 
iitit vu +≡ε  is a random perturbance including features not proxied by explanatory 
variables, with a component ( ) that collects time-invariant (or low-time-variant) 
unobservables.  
iv
Thus, politician takes into account current values of explanatory variables when 
taking a decision about the mode of production. This is similar to assuming myopia of 
the politician, as he does not take into account expected future values of these variables. 
This assumption is supported by the fact that politician’s preference-for-the-present rate 
is so high that events that would take place after the next election are ignored. 
Politician of municipality i chooses to privatize the service in t, given that he did not 
do so in t-1, if and only if 
  0
                                                                                                                                                                         
≥∆ itU
Otherwise, public production remains. We now introduce the irreversibility 
assumption, that is, going back is not possible once privatization has been undertaken. 
Recovering total public control over local service production becomes too costly. This 
 
associations, which arise when a municipality contracts out the water service to other municipality. All 
this cases are considered as municipality water supply associations in this paper. 
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assumption has been observed in the literature (see Christoffersen and Paldam, 2003), 
and also in our sample13. Its effect on our model is that a municipality that privatizes in 
some period gets out of the sample in further periods, as the probability of having the 
service privatized given that it was privatized in the past is equal to one. 
Let  be a binary variable that takes value 1 if municipality i has the service under 
study privatized at the end of period t, and 0 if, on the contrary, the municipality 
maintains the service publicly produced during that period. Then: 
itY
)()()0(),,01( 1 ititititititiititit vXFvXuPUPvXYYP +Β=+Β≤−=≥∆=== −  , 
and 
1)11(),,11( 11 −− ititiititit
Where F is the distribution function of the (negative) random perturbation that is not 
time-invariant or individual-specific. This i.i.d. part of the perturbation, with its 
negative sign, is interpreted as a random shock in favor of keeping public production
====== YYPvXYYP  
tion of municipality i to the likelihood function that is to be 
maximized follows as15
14. 
That way, the contribu
[ ]
[ ]∏
∏
=t 1
Where iT  is the random variable “time length municipality i takes to get out of the 
sample”, due either to privatization or to censoring, and it  is the value that this random 
variable takes. As there are six periods (terms of office) under study, the variable ma
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y 
take values between 1 and 6. Subscript t is also constrained to values between 1 and 6. 
                                                          
13 There are only two exceptions. In one municipality, a joint venture is to be taken over by the 
municipality by 2030. In a second municipality, the privatization process worked very poorly and the 
service came back to public hands. This last municipality has been dropped from the sample. 
14 The politician could be afraid of losing control over local service production once it is privatized. This 
explains why the politician still maintains a tough, inefficient supervision on the production techniques 
used in the privatized services (Bailey and Davidson, 1999), in order to avoid politically costly service 
performance shortfalls. Analogously, this fear could explain the existence of this shock against 
privatization. 
15 Firth and Payne (1999) follow a very similar model, suggested by Jenkins (1995). In fact, they deal 
with the heterogeneity problem in a very similar way. They try Heckman and Singer’s estimation too, and 
they do not succeed as well. 
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It has been said that  collects features that were not possible to observe, and hence 
the likelihood function may not be directly maximized right now. This variable must be 
integrated first as follows: 
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Where  is the expectation following the individual unobservable distribution 
function, G is this distribution function and g is the associated density function. Log-
likelihood function is obtained as the sum of the logarithm of each individual 
contribution. 
vE
I assume that the random shock against privatization follows a Gompert, or 
complementary log-log, distribution 
))exp(exp(1)( xxF −−=  
Gompertz distribution is adequate here against other more commonly used 
distributions as the normal (probit model) and the logistic (logit model). The former 
ones are symmetric, hence assuming a priori certain balance between 0s and 1s in the 
endogenous variable in each period. This does not correspond to data of this sample, 
where the number of 1s is clearly lower for each period. Instead, the Gompertz 
distribution suits better the data, as it is asymmetric in favor of the value 0. 
In a first estimation, it is assumed that the individual unobservables variable is 
distributed as a normal . An interesting alternative at this point could have 
been to proxy this distribution function by a discrete distribution with a finite number of 
mass points, hence estimating these points, their associated probabilities and the proper 
number of mass points. This approach was suggested by Heckman and Singer (1984), 
who checked that diverse duration models yielded very different results depending on 
the assumed time-invariant unobservable distribution function. 
),0( 2vN σ
Nevertheless, applying Heckman and Singer’s approach multiplies model 
complexity, and our result became so unstable and starting-point-depending that we 
gave this estimation up and we used the simple parametric approach above described. 
The use of the normal distribution for time-invariant individual unobservables is quite 
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usual, because the Gauss-Hermite’s quadrature method manages to simplify the 
function that is to be maximized. 
Now I turn my attention to the coefficient variability along time. Letting coefficient 
be flexibly time-variant is logical in our 20-year range under study, but imposing some 
stickiness is also quite convenient. The good properties of maximum likelihood 
estimation are asymptotic, so that increasing the number of observations per estimated 
coefficient could be of paramount importance. Constraining coefficients to be equal 
between period 1 and period 2, for instance, could provoke a slight bias due to lack of 
flexibility, but in turn it almost double the number of observations per coefficient, hence 
meeting the large sample condition. 
My first approach suggests a panel data discrete choice analysis with individual 
effects. I estimate two blocks of fixed-coefficient periods, the “eighties” (1980-1991) 
and the “nineties” (1992-2002)16. According to the hypotheses I postulate, this is a good 
starting point. 
There are motivations that justify this separating point in 1991. During the eighties, 
recovering a good condition for water service infrastructures was the main aim in the 
local political agenda concerning this service (FMQ Projectes i Estudis, 1999). 
Privatization was conceived, if so, as a means to reach this aim in municipalities that 
were running low of funds. During the nineties, once almost every municipality had 
solved the facilities problem, the agenda was redirected to the efficiency issue, so that 
privatization was then thought, if so, as a means for improving service performance. 
Other kinds of reform other than privatization were also starting gaining reputation. It is 
intuitive, then, that the nineties and the eighties may not have same coefficient values. 
I present in Table 1 the results obtained for both blocks of periods through the use of 
Intercooler Stata 6.017: 
                                                          
16 This implies that the random variable vi differs and is uncorrelated between blocks. Given the wide 
length of the blocks under consideration, this is a sensible assumption. 
17 This program is already used on every estimation presented in this paper. 
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Table 1. Factors influencing water supply service privatization in Spain. 
Gompertz model with panel data and unobservable individual effects. 
Variables   \   Blocks 1980-1991 1992-2002 
POP 0.0000232 
(2.134)** 
-0.0000347 
(-1.135) 
SPE -0.0542447 
(-0.767) 
0.0336874 
(1.254) 
MASS 0.6421256 
(0.808) 
-1.031557 
(-1.134) 
PI __ 0.6934292 
(1.828)* 
AFB __ -0.003931 
(-0.262) 
TOUR 0.0004997 
(2.041)** 
0.0000207 
(0.140) 
IND 0.0030173 
(0.189) 
0.0259726 
(1.872)* 
NEIGH -0.0009939 
(-0.067) 
0.031904 
(3.876)**** 
Constant -3.375865 
(-4.154)**** 
-4.200829 
(-5.730)**** 
12
2
+= v
v
σ
σρ   
0.4985037 
 
8.32 · 10-7
LR test 0=ρ  0.31 {1} 
[0.5747] 
0.00 {1} 
[0.9985] 
Wald test overall signification 
 
7.58 {6} 
[0.2705] 
30.17 {8} 
[0.0002]**** 
Number of municipalities 103 82 
Number of observations 291 205 
ln L -64.464941 -74.884168 
Notes: 
In brackets, the z-statistic (standard normal) values for the hypothesis that the coefficient is not 
significantly different from zero. 
In square brackets, the probability that the statistic is not significantly different from zero. 
In braces, the number of degrees of freedom. 
Signification levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 2.5%, **** 1%. 
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Variables PI and AFB have not been included in the first-block estimation. Data 
were not available for all or some of its periods, due to reasons that have been explained 
in previous section, so they have been excluded. 
At first glance results are consistent with what was postulated in Hypothesis 1. 
Results differ between decades. Even overall significance differs between decades. The 
signs of POP and TOUR coefficients are positive and significant at 5% level during the 
eighties, while they are not significant during the nineties. This supports the idea of a 
necessity of investments during the eighties. These projects were not affordable by 
municipalities alone. This necessity was stronger in large-populated and tourism-
intensive areas, and this led to privatization as a way to undertake these investments. It 
is also observed that POP coefficient is negative during the nineties, according to 
Hypothesis 2, although the coefficient is not significantly different from zero. 
There is also minor evidence in favor of Hypothesis 3. The sign of PI coefficient is 
positive and significant during the nineties, though at 10% level. Unfortunately, we 
cannot state whether this effect is also present during the eighties or not, so our findings 
are not conclusive on this issue for the moment.  
Results of Table 1 are quite more favorable to Hypothesis 4, the dynamic 
neighboring effect. It is seen that the sign of NEIGH coefficient is positive and 
significant and the 1% level during the nineties. At the beginning of this decade, each 
Official Zone in Catalonia had more than 10% municipalities that had privatized the 
water supply service. So only an expansion-within-the-zone plan was possible for an 
incumbent firm, as pioneering expansions to other zones were already done. Apparently, 
the static neighboring effect had its effects during these years. During the eighties, on 
the contrary, variable NEIGH had no significant effects, and it even had (non-
significant) negative coefficient sign. Dynamic neighboring effect hypothesis appears to 
work well given this result. At the first stages of the privatization spreading process, 
there were zones where none of the municipalities had undertaken privatization 
processes in this service, so that expansion-to-other-zones plans could be even more 
appealing for a incumbent firm than expansion-within-a-zone ones, hence outweighing 
the static neighboring effect. 
Concerning Hypothesis 5, our results are less disappointing than could seem given 
the fact that the sign of AFB is not significant at all. In fact, I am postulating that public 
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finance issues matter in specific periods when there are very hard financial constraints, 
so only a detailed study of the economic crisis period 1992-1995 would be determinant. 
I briefly comment on the rest of explanatory variables. Neither SPE nor MASS have 
significant coefficients in any block. Coefficient values are also quite unstable, which 
suggest a more detailed exploration. The IND variable has significantly positive 
coefficient (at the 10% level) during the nineties, but the coefficient during the eighties 
is not significant. This also suggests a more detailed exploration, which is given further. 
The pseudo-correlation coefficient ρ , which measures the relative importance of the 
individual-specific unobservable variable, is definitely higher in the first-block 
estimation than in the second. This could reveal that omitted variables PI and AFB play 
a role during the eighties as well. The possible omitted-variable bias is in great part 
addressed by the panel data estimation. Moreover, ρ  is not significant at all in any of 
the blocks. This is important as it reveals that ignoring the existence of individual-
specific unobservables would not lead to serious estimation bias. And doing so implies 
many advantages, as the reasonable specification-test-design flexibility and higher 
computational precision that a simple pooling estimation model has. So I propose the 
following simple log-likelihood function, which ignores the individual-specific effect: 
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Where  is the set of all municipalities than are not censored (or out of the sample) 
in t. The good news about this formula is that it means that maximizing global 
likelihood is equivalent to maximizing associated partial period-specific log-likelihoods 
one by one. Nevertheless, it is convenient to aggregate periods (assuming constant 
coefficients between them) whenever possible, so that finite sample problems are 
avoided. In a first stage, I tried to emulate the block division of Table 1. However, the 
likelihood ratio test rejects the stability of the model within second block. Its chi-
squared statistic is equal to 32.857352 with 16 degrees of freedom, while the 95% 
percentile is 26.30 and also the 99% percentile is 32.00. 
tN
So I have divided the six periods under study in three blocks with two periods in 
each one: 1980-1987, 1988-1995 and 1996-2002. Likelihood ratio tests yield the 
following respective results: 4.162724 (6), 14.6407 (7) and 9.320556 (8). Numbers in 
brackets are the degrees of freedom. Stability of the coefficients is not rejected either in 
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the first or in the third blocks. For the second block, there are still stability problems as 
the 95% percentile of the relevant chi-squared distribution is 14.07. 
What I do then is to present the results for these three blocks, while I present and 
discuss a period-by-period estimation of the second block in the appendix. Pooled data 
maximum likelihood estimation with individual standard-error-estimation clustering is 
presented in Table 2. In order to avoid redundancies, I shall only discuss on the new 
information that this more flexible estimation procedure rises concerning my 
hypotheses. 
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Table 2. Factors influencing water supply service privatization in Spain. 
Gompertz model with pooled data and individual clustering. 
Variables  \  Blocks 1980-1987 1988-1995 1996-2002 
POP 0.0000328 
(3.155)**** 
-8.07·10-6
(-0.463) 
-0.000048 
(-1.908)* 
SPE -0.0398277 
(-0.717) 
0.0112122 
(0.167) 
0.0230515 
(0.597) 
MASS __ 1.230749 
(1.254) 
-0.9889664 
(-0.699) 
PI __ 0.2610911 
(0.328) 
0.8824532 
(1.791)* 
AFB __ __ 
 
-0.0044086 
(-0.206) 
TOUR 0.000637 
(2.426)*** 
-0.0000569 
(-0.368) 
0.0000944 
(0.833) 
IND 0.0114551 
(0.429) 
-0.0000512 
(-0.002) 
0.0399798 
(2.684)**** 
NEIGH -0.0432482 
(-1.751)* 
0.0281871 
(1.058) 
0.0339084 
(3.125)**** 
Constant -2.941201 
(-3.241)**** 
-4.017493 
(-3.283)**** 
-4.460909 
(-5.040)**** 
Wald Test overall 
signification 
13.31 {5} 
[0.0206]*** 
6.78 {7} 
[0.4522] 
27.81 {8} 
[0.0005]**** 
Number of 
municipalities 
103 92 79 
Number of 
observations 
200 177 136 
ln L -38.030545 -36.14809 -55.679699 
Notes: 
In brackets, the z-statistic (standard normal) values for the hypothesis that the coefficient is not 
significantly different from zero. 
In square brackets, the probability that the statistic is not significantly different from zero. 
In braces, the number of degrees of freedom. 
Signification levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 2.5%, **** 1%. 
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It is immediately seen in the results that the second block coefficients are overall 
non-significant. Second block is understood as an impasse between two ways of 
conceiving the privatization decision. A more desegregated estimation of the two 
periods of this block is shown and discussed in the appendix. As it is already seen there, 
the only significant result obtained for this block consists of the finding of some weak 
evidence in favor of Hypothesis 5. 
In the first and the third blocks, the model is significant overall. Variables AFB and 
PI have not been included in the blocks where there were no data available. Variable 
MASS has been skipped in the first block estimation due to perfect collineality with the 
endogenous variable. All observations with value 1 for this variable had value 1 for the 
endogenous one. 
Results are again accordant to Hypothesis 1, and give (weak) support to Hypothesis 
2. The signs of POP and TOUR coefficients are positive and highly significant in the 
first block (early eighties), while TOUR makes no significant effect afterwards and POP 
even makes a negative and significant effect at 10% level in the third block (late 
nineties). Hence, a largely populated municipality, with high-skilled politicians and 
public servants, that has not privatized the water service during the eighties now tends 
(on average) to undertake other kinds of service production reform that keep total public 
control over it. Among these new kinds of reform, creation and operation of publicly 
owned companies, municipality association and contracting out to another municipality 
are nowadays frequently used. 
Concerning Hypothesis 3, results provide new support to the idea that ideological 
issues start mattering during the nineties. Although information about it cannot be 
extracted from the first block, it can be extracted for the second block. In this block, PI 
makes no significant effect at all. In the third block, on the contrary, there is a weakly 
significant and positive effect of PI on the privatization trend. This supports the idea of 
ideology importance when efficiency issues and uncertainty about the best production 
method enter the municipal political agenda. 
With respect to Hypothesis 4, results confirm the existence of dynamic neighboring 
effect. NEIGH coefficient in the 1980-1987 block is negative and significant at 10% 
level. It has positive sign afterwards, and this sign is significant at 1% level in the 1996-
2002 block. While in the first stages of the privatization spreading process one observes 
a higher propensity to privatization in zones where it is a seldom practice, in the last 
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stages privatization spreads over the zones where it is an already usual procedure. This 
suits perfectly with the dynamic neighboring effect hypothesis that is proposed in this 
paper. 
More comments on Hypothesis 5 are presented in the appendix. The ESP variable 
coefficient is never significant, and this makes us rethink on the role that population 
dispersion plays in the privatization process. The complexity-by-dispersion argument 
justifying the inclusion of this variable apparently does not work. The MASS variable 
sign is positive but never significant. In this case, results accord to the trade-off effects I 
explained in the previous section. 
Finally, it is seen that variable IND has positive and significant (at 1% level) 
coefficient only in the third block, that is, between 1996 and 2002. It loses signification 
in other periods. To find out why this coefficient is significant only in recent years, that 
is, why industrial interest groups push strongly towards privatization in recent years 
only, I pay attention to regulatory reforms that water sector experienced in 1999. In this 
year, the Catalonian Water Agency was created in order to face increasing quality 
standards in all features of water cycle, which were to be regulated by the European 
Union. Accomplishment of new standards implied higher prices for polluting water uses 
(mostly industrial). This price-increasing pressure could worry water-intensive 
productive sectors. These facts made industrial sector strongly push for better payment 
conditions. One strategy that, on the light of my results, was put in practice consisted on 
separating water supply services from the political control, in order to reduce the risk of 
water price cross-subsidization in favor of households (voters).  
 
Conclusions 
In this paper, I present and apply a duration model in order to study factors that 
determine the privatization process in municipal water supply services in Spain during 
its young democratic system (1979-2002). As far as I know, this is the first time that a 
duration model is used in the study of local service privatization. 
This model allows us to identify the evolving pattern of these factors, hence 
supporting that local service privatization do not always respond to the same causes in 
any period of time. Results do not reject the general idea that in Spain, the first years of 
its young modern democracy were devoted, with respect to water services, to the 
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investment in infrastructures that were in bad condition as an inheritance from the 
previous dictatorial regime. This explains privatization during these years as a way to 
obtain funds in order to undertake these investments. In the nineties, however, once 
infrastructures were satisfactorily working, privatization was designed as a way to 
improve efficiency. In turn, alternative ways to improve service performance started 
gaining popularity, and municipalities with high-skilled politicians and bureaucrats 
preferred (on average) to undertake these kinds of reform. 
During the nineties as well, this variety of different ways to improve efficiency and 
the uncertainty around the goodness of privatization in a service were privatized market 
concentration increases continuously as time goes by were sufficient to allow some 
space for party differentiation concerning local public sector reform. On average, 
conservative governments still relied on privatization as the best way to improve 
efficiency, while non-conservative governments tried alternative ways to achieve the 
same objectives. Apart from this policy differentiation, these factors (variety and 
uncertainty) could have permitted parties to discursively justify the search for (hidden) 
aims in their relations with water sector private firms. Altogether, this result contradicts 
what is recursively found in the literature. I break then the consensus about the lack of 
party differentiation concerning the mode of production of local services. In my paper, I 
state that there are punctual periods in which the public-private dilemma forms real (not 
only discursive) part of the political arena in local politics. 
As another feature of this paper, I find what I have called the dynamic neighboring 
effect, which is an extension of the “static” neighboring effect of Bel and Miralles 
(2003) and Christoffersen and Paldam (2003). In recent years, and coinciding with these 
papers, I find that service privatization decision is more frequent in municipalities that 
are surrounded by other ones that have previously privatized the service. But in 
previous stages of the privatization spreading process, privatization decision does not 
meet this condition. Even the opposite comes true: privatization becomes slightly more 
frequent in zones where almost all municipalities were producing the service in-house. 
This phenomenon has to do with private water suppliers’ long-term expansion 
strategies. It could be more appealing for a firm to try to expand (even by means of 
wonderful offers to municipalities) to zones that are non-exploited by other firms if firm 
knows that, once installed in the zone, it is surely going to spread over more 
municipalities there sooner or later. 
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Weak evidence has been found in favor of municipal budget and indebtment 
constraints as a factor positively influencing privatization decision at the local level. For 
my sample, indebtment capacity constraints only mattered when Spain faced the hard 
1992-1994 economic crisis. Just valley periods of the economic cycle make budget 
shortfalls be decisive in the privatization decision at the local level. 
In this paper, I also try to assess to which extent different public sector reforms are 
interrelated, either by incompatibility or by complementariety. In particular, I try to see 
the effects of municipality association on the tendency to privatization, concerning 
water supply. I find that, on average, both methods do not have a general relation. In 
some cases they are incompatible, as municipality association could be viewed as an 
alternative to privatization in the search for geographical scale economies exploitation. 
In some other cases, they are complementary, because municipality association implies 
that privatization decision becomes less politically costly due to the increase in the 
distance between citizens (voters) and decision-takers. 
Finally, I find that the group-of-interest factor has its importance in the privatization 
decision in some periods of time. For the Spanish case, and particularly for the 
Catalonian municipality sample, recent regulations increasing polluting water use price 
in particular and industrial use price in general stimulated industrial sector to look for 
better water purchase conditions. One strategy consisted of pushing politicians towards 
privatization, in order to separate the water service from the public control, and hence 
reducing possible cross-subsidization in favor of domestic consumers (voters). 
All these findings were mostly possible because I was able to collect panel data for 
133 municipalities and six terms of office per municipality. This allowed me to shed 
more light to the local service privatization issue as an evolving process than previous 
static, cross-section discrete choice analyses found in the literature. 
The study of other factors influencing local service privatization is addressed in 
further research. For instance, it would be appealing to test Biais and Perotti (2002) 
prediction that ideology (and other party’s interests) is more influent on the mode-of-
production decision when there is a low re-election risk. I also leave for further research 
the study of the consequences of the local service privatization spreading process on 
social welfare in Spain. 
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Appendix 
I proceed to present the results that I obtain for the block 1988-1995, once having 
split its two periods, the 1988-1991 and the 1992-1995 terms of office. I use a Gompertz 
model with robust variance-covariance matrix estimation. 
Table 3. Factors determining water supply service privatization in Spain. 
1988-1991 and 1992-1995 periods. Gompertz model with robust standard errors. 
Variables  \  Periods 1988-1991 1992-1995 1992-1995(bis) 
POP -0.0000316 
(-0.944) 
0.0000123 
(1.089) 
0.0000245 
(2.519)*** 
SPE -0.2129977 
(-1.804)* 
0.0770639 
(2.214)** 
0.1261368 
(2.620)**** 
MASS 2.516838 
(2.495)*** 
__ __ 
PI 1.910593 
(2.010)** 
-1.937924 
(-2.090)** 
-1.62218 
(-1.100) 
AFB __ 
 
0.107026 
(1.757)* 
__ 
TOUR -0.0000478 
(-0.116) 
-0.0002943 
(-1.727)* 
-0.0001051 
(-0.220) 
IND -0.0163431 
(-0.608) 
0.0682209 
(0.661) 
0.029286 
(0.597) 
NEIGH 0.1077624 
(1.766)* 
-0.088493 
(-1.209) 
-0.0439952 
(-1.454) 
Constant -6.249649 
(-2.357)*** 
-5.909557 
(-1.281) 
-3.696226 
(-1.881)* 
Wald test overall 
signification  
15.30 {7} 
[0.0324]** 
25.90 {7} 
[0.0005]**** 
36.01 {6} 
[0.0000]**** 
Number 
municipalities 
92 69 85 
Number privatizations 7 3 3 
Notes: 
In brackets, the z-statistic (standard normal) values for the hypothesis that the coefficient is not 
significantly different from zero. 
In square brackets, the probability that the statistic is not significantly different from zero. 
In braces, the number of degrees of freedom. 
Signification levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 2.5%, **** 1%. 
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AFB variable is not included in the 1988-1991 period because, as explained before, 
data on this variable are only available from 1990 on. MASS has been dropped from the 
1992-1995 estimation because of the collinearity problems it was provoking. None of 
the three privatizing municipalities during this period were using municipality 
association. 
It can be seen that period-by-period estimation has problems most probably related 
to maximum likelihood estimation in small samples. We see the high instability of 
results. Coefficient signs change from one period to another in many cases, so that these 
so variable results must be taken with skepticism. Only the sign of TOUR coefficient 
does not change between periods. But as its negative sign sounds quite unintuitive, I 
have investigated on multicollinearity problems giving rise to this sign. I find that 
TOUR is highly correlated to AFB in 1992-1995 period (0.45 correlation coefficient). 
Hence, I have run a new estimation (1992-1995bis) without AFB, in order to see what 
happens with TOUR coefficient. It is seen that it loses signification, so I ignore it. 
Concerning MASS variable coefficient, we see that its sign is positive and significant 
at the 1% level during the 1988-1991 period. However, recall that there was a perfect 
negative correlation between MASS and the endogenous variable in the 1992-1995 
period. Both results could be explained again by typical small sample instability 
problem. Besides, joint estimation of both periods (see Table 2) revealed no 
signification for the coefficient of this variable. Under such confusion, I decide to 
ignore this variable as well. 
Consequently, I just comment on the AFB variable coefficient, which is the 
remaining coefficient that is significant in the period where data were available. It 
cannot be seen whether this significant positive sign is stable or not given the lack of 
data for the 1988-1991 period. Nevertheless, the likelihood ratio test rejects that AFB 
coefficient is not significant. The test chi-squared statistic, with one degree of freedom, 
is equal to 5.19444, while the 97.5% percentile of this distribution is 5.02. So I can state 
that I find weak evidence in favor of Hypothesis 5. 
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